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Accession And originAl ownership
Thomas W. Merrill1
ABSTRACT
Although first possession is generally assumed to be the dominant means of es-
tablishing original ownership of property, there is a second but less studied prin-
ciple for initiating ownership, called accession, which awards new resources to 
the owner of existing property most prominently connected to the new resource. 
Accession applies across a wide variety of areas, from determining rights to baby 
animals and growing crops to determining ownership of derivative rights under in-
tellectual property laws. Accession shares common features with first possession, 
in that both principles assign ownership uniquely in a way that imposes minimal 
information cost burdens on society. But accession differs from first possession in 
that it does not presuppose that rights are established in an open access commons 
and does not require the performance of an act to establish ownership. These fea-
tures of accession make it, as a rule, more efficient than first possession, at least 
where property rights are thick and securely enforced. More broadly, accession can 
be seen as the critical legal principle that generates the internalization function of 
property, insofar as gains and losses attributable to the management of resources 
are automatically assigned to the most prominently connected property by acces-
sion. Although the story of accession is generally a positive one from an efficiency 
perspective, it may be more problematic from several normative perspectives, 
which are briefly considered.
1 .  introduction
Most objects we own as property have been acquired from someone else 
through consensual transactions, such as purchase, gift, or inheritance. In 
these situations the things we acquire were recognized to be property in the 
hands of the person from whom we acquired them. In certain more unusual 
circumstances, we acquire things through nonconsensual transactions, such as 
1 Professor, Yale Law School. Thanks to participants in faculty workshops at Berkeley, Colorado, 
Columbia, Iowa, Harvard, and Virginia law schools for feedback on earlier drafts. I am espe-
cially grateful to Bob Cooter, Mel Eisenberg, Einer Elhauge, Kent Greenwalt, Liz Magill, Rob 
Merges, Henry Smith, Claire Priest, and Tim Wu for their comments. Brent Kingsbury and 
Gina Cora provided valuable research assistance.
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adverse possession, forfeiture, or eminent domain. Yet in these cases, too, the 
objects we acquire as property were recognized to be property in the hands of 
the person from whom they were taken. Perhaps the most enduring question 
in property is how these various chains of title–whether based on consensual 
or nonconsensual transactions–get started. How do objects that are not rec-
ognized as property or are thought to have no owner enter the universe of 
owned objects?
The dominant understanding, especially in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, is that original ownership is established by first possession (Epstein 
1979; Lueck 1995). Resources are imagined as originally existing in an 
open-access commons or the public domain. Individuals acquire property 
rights in some portion of this common pool by being the first to reduce 
particular things to possession. John Locke’s famous account of the ori-
gins of property looms large here. Locke posited that “in the beginning all 
the World was America” (Locke, 301), by which he meant a world rich in 
natural resources and thinly populated by people who survived by hunting, 
fishing, or gathering acorns in the forest.
This article challenges first possession’s claim to preeminence as the 
method of establishing original title to property. There is a second, distinct 
way of initiating ownership, which I call the principle of accession. The 
principle of accession holds that ownership is established by assigning re-
sources to the owner of some other thing that is already owned. Examples 
include the understanding that newborn animals belong to the person who 
owns the newborn’s mother, that minerals discovered under the ground 
belong to the owner of the surface estate, and that interest paid on a deposit 
of money belongs to the owner of the principal. First possession and acces-
sion have distinct spheres of application. Yet in some circumstances either 
principle could be used to resolve a dispute over original title. In these areas 
of overlap, accession rather than first possession tends to prevail. Further, 
as property rights become thicker and economic values associated with re-
sources become larger, accession increasingly dominates first possession.
The principle of accession once commanded the attention of thinkers of 
the first rank. Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and David Hume all had 
interesting things to say about accession. This tradition has died out, at 
least in English language literature about property rights. One aspiration 
of this article is to revive interest in accession, with particular focus on how 
the principle both complements and competes with first possession as a 
means of establishing original ownership.
2
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The article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of the princi-
ple of accession in Anglo-American law. This is designed to show the ubiquity 
and importance of accession in initiating chains of title, as well as to suggest 
that accession tends to trump first possession when the two overlap.
Part II considers some of the ways in which accession complements first 
possession. Both principles provide a foundation for a system of property 
rights by bringing unclaimed or contested resources under the control of 
a singular owner-gatekeeper. This assigns managerial authority over re-
sources in an unambiguous fashion and permits resources to be reallo-
cated through transfers so they end up in the hands of those who can 
extract the most value from them. Significantly, both strategies rely on 
simple rules that are easily observed and understood and hence are largely 
self-applying. Therefore, both principles appear to satisfy the very exact-
ing information cost constraints that must be observed for any system of 
property rights to function.
Part III addresses some critical differences between first possession and 
accession, which might explain why accession seems to dominate first pos-
session in contexts where they overlap or where property rights are thick 
and well-established. First possession assigns resources based on a competi-
tion among claimants, whereas accession assigns resources to those likely 
to be competent mangers of the resource. The competitive nature of first 
possession, together with its background assumption that resources exist in 
an open access commons, generates a number of familiar pathologies: ex-
cessive racing behavior, commons tragedies, inadequate incentives to invest 
in the common pool, and barriers to collective action. Significantly, each of 
these pathologies is avoided or reduced if we award original ownership by 
accession. First possession can occasionally be superior where the owner 
of the primary asset has limited ability to control or exploit the derivative 
asset or where first possession generates lower administrative costs. But as 
property systems become more developed, accession increasingly displaces 
first possession.
Part IV develops the most far-reaching economic justification for acces-
sion: it is the legal principle that generates the internalization function we 
associate with the institution of property. In its broadest application, the 
principle of accession means that all gains and losses associated with the 
management of resources are assigned to the owner of the most promi-
nently connected property. This automatic sweeping function ensures 
that the gains and losses attributable to management decisions regarding 
5
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assets are assigned to the owner of those assets, no questions asked. Like 
all rules, this automatic assignment of gains and losses is overbroad. It 
means that owners of existing resources experience windfall gains and 
losses that have nothing to do with their management prowess, as when 
oil is discovered under the family farm. But the rule of automatic assign-
ment has a powerful incentive effect on owners because it means that 
gains and losses that are attributable to managerial prowess are always 
captured, too. This internalization feature is critical to the general effi-
ciency of property rights; consequently accession is critical to the effi-
ciency of property rights.
Part V offers some observations about the implications of accession for 
normative evaluations of the institution of property. Because the principle 
of accession assigns ownership of new or unclaimed resources based on 
the status of being an existing property owner, it complicates the standard 
Lockean defense of private property grounded in a sequence of volition-
al acts starting with first possession. Accession also complicates egalitar-
ian theories, insofar as accession creates a multiplier effect enhancing the 
wealth of owners of discrete assets that does not apply to those who have 
only a claim on a general share of societal resources. Finally, accession con-
tributes to an expanding sphere of property and a concomitant shrinking 
of the public domain. If one believes that there is inherent value in preserv-
ing the public domain–a proposition widely endorsed today by many intel-
lectual property scholars–then accession has problematic consequences for 
this reason, too.
2.  the domAin of Accession
The principle of first possession is universally recognized as one way of es-
tablishing original ownership. First possession is grounded in a conception 
of being the first to possess some object that is unowned. Valuable resources 
are regarded as originally existing in an open access commons or the pub-
lic domain2–a state of affairs in which valuable resources exist but no one 
has ownership over them. Ownership is awarded to the first person who 
2 Commons is potentially misleading here because most physical spaces that have been called the 
commons or a common are in fact restricted to members of particular communities and are 
governed by social norms if not legal rules and regulations (Eggertsson; Ostrom). I will use 
commons and open access interchangeably to refer to a condition in which valuable resources 
are unowned and are regarded as being up for grabs by the first taker. 
9
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demonstrates a sufficient degree of control over some portion of these resourc-
es to be deemed to be in “possession” of them. The acts that qualify as posses-
sion are understood to vary according to social context (Ellickson, 1989).
My central claim in this article is that there is a second mechanism for 
establishing original ownership, which I call the principle of accession. 
Accession is grounded in a conception of original title as an attachment to 
existing ownership rights. Typically, valuable things are regarded as existing 
in a background condition occupied by preexisting property rights. When 
new resources are discovered or changes in relative values cause previously 
ignored questions of ownership to become salient, the newly discovered 
or newly salient resource is awarded to the person who owns as property 
some other resource prominently connected with the newly discovered or 
salient thing. The factors that establish prominent connection, in a fashion 
analogous to those that establish first possession, also vary according to 
social context.
One can describe the difference between first possession and accession 
metaphorically. First possession can be said to assign ownership based on 
the outcome of a race. Various claimants compete to be first to establish 
control over some valuable prize, like the Sooners galloping off at the sound 
of a gun to be the first to claim to some tract of land in the Oklahoma ter-
ritory (Anderson and Hill 2002). Accession operates like a magnet. Imagine 
that the contested object is like an iron pellet dropped on a table covered 
by various magnets; the pellet moves toward and becomes affixed to the 
magnet that exerts the strongest magnetic force on it, as determined by the 
size and power of the magnets as well as their physical proximity to the pel-
let. Similarly, prominent connection for purposes of accession is a function 
not merely of physical proximity but also other forces (mass, for example) 
that enter into our perception of what it means to say that something has a 
prominent connection to something else.
The principle of accession was well known to the Romans and was dis-
cussed by early English writers, including Bracton, Hume, and Blackstone. 
Today, the principle has almost entirely disappeared from the English lan-
guage literature on property rights.3 I am not sure what accounts for this ob-
scurity. One possible explanation has to do with terminology. Around the turn 
3 To take but one example, Holmes, in the chapter on “Possession” in his influential lectures on 
the common law, omitted any reference to accession as a mode of acquiring original ownership 
of property (Holmes 192-94). 
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of the twentieth century, the word accession came to be associated primarily 
with certain narrow doctrines dealing with mistaken improvers of personal 
property.4 This may have masked the general principle of accession, which 
as we shall see, applies much more broadly. Another and related explana-
tion is that the narrow doctrine is covered by article nine of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which might have led scholars to regard the subject as 
belonging to commercial law.5
If accession is distinct from first possession as a basis for establishing orig-
inal ownership, how important is this principle in actual property systems? 
Accession is extremely widespread; indeed, I will argue it is ubiquitous.
A. traditional examples
The operation of accession is easiest to grasp in relatively elemental con-
texts. After we see the principle of accession at work in these simple settings, 
we will be in a better position to perceive that it also operates in other con-
texts involving intangible rights and often operates in competition with the 
principle of first possession.
1. Newborn animals. Let us begin with some folksy examples that govern 
agrarian activities. Under the doctrine of increase, “[t]he general rule, in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, is that the offspring or increase 
of tame or domestic animals belongs to the owner of the dam or mother” 
(Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1963)). Here we have a strik-
ing example of a new resource–the newborn animal–that enters the world. 
4 A much-cited article (Arnold) reflects this narrowing of the use of the term accession. Arnold 
treated the Roman law doctrines of specificatio (transformation of personal property by the la-
bor of another) and accessio (joinder of personal property of two persons into a single item) as 
two variations on a single doctrine, which he called accession. He also distinguished confusion 
as a separate doctrine from what he called accession and put aside other doctrines like increase, 
fixtures, and accretion, “which in the Roman law, came within the broadest meaning of the 
accession” (Arnold, 104). By 1936, when the leading modern treatise on personal property 
was written, a similar classificatory scheme was followed (Brown 1936). Brown too used the 
word accession to cover both specificatio and accessio, distinguished accession and confusion, 
and treated other doctrines like fixtures and emblements as unrelated (Brown, 1936 at 46-74; 
627-89; 690-704).
5 See UCC 9-335 (rule of priority for security interests in “accessions”); id. 9-336 (rule of pri-
ority for security interests in “commingled goods”); see also UCC 9-315(b) (secured party’s 
rights on disposition of commingled goods). The UCC basically inverts the common law con-
cepts, defining an accession as a physical uniting of goods such that the identity of the original 
goods is not lost. See UCC 9-102. What the common law regarded as an accession–the uniting 
of goods so that their identities were lost–the UCC describes as a case of “commingled goods.” 
Needless to say, this kind of terminological revisionism does little to encourage inquiry into 
historical principles (see Frish). 
14
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Conceivably, ownership of this new resource could be assigned to its first 
possessor. Instead, ownership of newborn animals is uniformly assigned to 
the person who owns another resource that has a prominent connection to 
the new resource–the newborn’s mother. Notice that prominent connec-
tion in this instance is biological rather than physical, although presumably 
in most cases maternal biological connection will translate into physical 
proximity. Felix Cohen once reported that all known legal systems follow 
the rule of increase (Cohen, 366).6
2. Crops. When we turn from animals to plants, similar rules apply. So-
called fructus naturales–trees, bushes, and other perennials and their fruits–are 
always regarded as belonging to the owner of the soil. Thus, provided the land 
is privately owned, even the Lockean exercise of gathering acorns from the 
forest is actually governed by the principle of accession rather than first pos-
session. The rules that apply to fructus industriales–annual crops that require 
planting and cultivation–are slightly different. Here, too, the baseline rule is 
that growing crops belong to the owner of the soil. Thus, for example, a sale 
of a farm is presumed to include the rights to growing crops, absent a reserva-
tion to the contrary (Brown 1955, 818). Sometimes the identity of the person 
in possession of the soil changes between the planting and harvesting of the 
crops, for example, when a life tenant dies or a tenant at will is terminated. 
When this happens, under the doctrine of emblements, the crops belong to 
the person in possession of the soil when the crops were planted. This inter-
esting wrinkle presumably protects good faith cultivators from being denied 
the fruits of their labors. Nevertheless, the doctrine of emblements can also be 
seen as a species of the principle of accession, insofar as the person in posses-
sion at the planting (and afterwards) can be said to have a more prominent 
connection to the crops than the person who does the harvesting.7
3. Accretion. Another traditional application of the principle of accession 
is the doctrine of accretion. This provides that a riparian landowner whose 
land is gradually augmented by alluvial formations owns the newly formed 
land (see, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892)). In theory, we could 
6 The rule was subject to an exception in English common law for baby swans or cygnets, which 
were divided equally between the owner of the cock and the owner of the hen (The Case of 
Swans, [1592] 77 Eng. Rep. 435). The court opined that this was because of the strict mo-
nogamy of swan cocks, in marked contrast to “kine or other brute beasts” (at 437), which 
presumably eliminated any dispute about paternity. 
7 Both fructus rules, like the doctrine of increase, are defaults; the individual who is designated 
the owner under the accession rule can designate by contract some other person as owner. But 
this feature is true of most property rules, which assume alienability of the right.
17
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declare that the new soil belongs to the first possessor or to the state to dis-
tribute as it sees fit. But no known legal system, going back to Roman times, 
follows such an approach. Instead, the new soil always goes to the riparian 
owner on whose banks the new land is attached, who readily can be said to 
have the most prominent relationship to it.8
4. Commingled goods. Sometimes goods are “physically united with other 
goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass” (see 
U.C.C. § 9-336(a)). This creates a problem in identifying the owner of the re-
sulting object. The Romans applied three doctrines here: accessio, specificatio, 
and confusio (Slater). Accessio applied when two different items were joined 
together in a production process, as when A supplied flour that was put into 
sacks owned by B. Specificatio applied when A owned raw material that was 
transformed by B’s labor into a different product, like lumber milled into 
barrel hoops. Confusio applied when two or more persons provided similar 
inputs that were mixed together in such a way that their contributions could 
not be distinguished, as when grain from two or more farmers was combined 
in single container. American courts today tend to use the word accession 
to cover both accessio and specificatio and then distinguish accession from 
confusion (confusio).9 Notwithstanding the verbal peregrinations, the basic 
principle in all areas reflects a straightforward application of the principle of 
accession. The question in each case is which owner of inputs has supplied 
the larger or more valuable input–i.e., has established the most prominent 
connection (Shaham and Sher). Variations emerge with respect to whether 
the person who supplies the less valuable input is entitled to compensation.10 
But as to the basic question of ownership, the principle of accession prevails.
8 In contrast, when a river or another body of water suddenly changes its course, the boundaries 
remain the same under the principle of avulsion. A possible explanation might be that with 
avulsion, as opposed to accretion, there is a clear loser as well as a winner. The intuition may be 
that it would be too destabilizing to the system of property rights to declare that a freak event 
of nature can divest property from A and transfer it to B.
9 See note 3.
10 What the Romans called specificatio presents the most interesting qualifications, perhaps be-
cause recognizing a general right of compensation for unsolicited services would create an 
obvious moral hazard. We do not want to have to pay the laundry for shirt monogramming 
we did not order. Thus, most courts do not award the object to the laborer, even if the labor 
is the larger or more valuable input, unless the laborer acted in good faith–i.e. without actual 
knowledge of the superior claim of the owner of the object (Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 
(1871)). Also, if the laborer is found to have made the smaller or less valuable input, the laborer 
generally has no right of action for restitution for the value of the labor services. In contrast, if 
the supplier of the physical input is determined to provide the smaller or less valuable input, 
this person can sue the laborer (who is awarded the object) for conversion damages.
19
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5. Ad coelum. Although not generally recognized as an example of ac-
cession, the ad coelum doctrine,11 which declares that the owner of the 
surface of land owns from the depths to the sky, is in fact one of the most 
important incarnations of the principle. Justice Douglas once declared 
that this doctrine “has no place in the modern world” (United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1942)). In fact, the doctrine is fundamental to 
property rights in land. Deeds to land are nearly always stated in terms of 
some measurement of the surface area. Because of the ad coelum rule, the 
owner of the surface is also entitled to dig below the surface (for example, 
to construct a basement for a building) and to build above the surface (to 
build the building itself). As applied in American law, the ad coelum rule 
also means that, absent a severance, the owner of the surface owns any 
minerals discovered below the surface and any caves discovered beneath 
the surface and has the right to extract groundwater and oil and gas from 
beneath the surface.
It is relatively easy to see that the ad coelum rule is yet another applica-
tion of the principle of accession. We start with ownership of the surface. 
Then, as new increments in value are discovered beneath the surface (min-
erals, caves, groundwater) or above the surface (capacities to exploit air 
rights), these increments in value are automatically assigned to the owner 
of the surface—the most prominent preassigned property right. Not sur-
prisingly, the rule can be found in Roman sources and is apparently fol-
lowed in all civil and common law jurisdictions (Carroll).
6. Fixtures. Another application of considerable ongoing significance 
is the doctrine of fixtures. A fixture is “a thing which, although originally 
a movable chattel, is by reason of its annexation to, or association in use 
with land, regarded as part of the land” (Brown, 1955, 698). The case law 
is voluminous, and several factors play a role in determining whether a 
chattel is a fixture: physical attachment to the realty, appropriation to the 
use or purpose of the realty, and common understandings are all said to 
be relevant (Squillante; van Vliet). But the basic inquiry is similar to what 
we see under the principle of accession more generally, asking whether 
the chattel bears a relationship to the land that is so physically close or 
otherwise prominent that the chattel should be regarded as being owned 
by the owner of the land.
11 Short for cjus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. This has been translated as “to 
whomever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and the depths.” 
20
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B. intangible rights
We can also find examples of the principle of accession at work with respect 
to intangible property, although the term accession is rarely encountered in 
this context.
1. Interest. Consider the question of who owns the interest earned on 
a fund of money that has been deposited in an interest-bearing account. 
Ordinarily, of course, the matter will be governed by contract; the owner of 
the fund will enter into a contract with the depository institution that spec-
ifies what happens to the interest. But under some circumstances involving 
escrow funds, security deposits, or prepayments for services, there might 
be no contract or the government might mandate that interest be paid as 
a matter of law. As discussed by the Supreme Court in no less than three 
modern decisions, the common law rule here is that interest follows princi-
pal (Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003); Philips 
v. Washington Legal Found, 524 U.S. 156, 164-71 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162-64 (1980)). In other words, the 
interest is understood to belong to the owner of another resource promi-
nently connected with the interest—the principal on which the interest was 
earned. This rule is so firmly entrenched that the Court has (perhaps un-
wisely) given it a constitutional dimension which appears to be impervious 
to legislative modification.
2. Adaptation rights. The principle of accession also plays a large role in 
intellectual property regimes. Copyright provides a particularly striking il-
lustration. The Copyright Act confers on the holder of a copyright not only 
the exclusive right to copy the work, but also the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works based on the work, known as adaptation rights (17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2)). For example, the author of a copyrighted book has the exclusive 
right to prepare a screenplay for a movie based on the book. Here we see a 
clear instance of the holder of the more prominent property—the original 
book—being also given the right to control lesser (meaning here less origi-
nal) variations on this right (Abramowicz, 2005).
3. Patent improvements. Patent law is also very accession-like in its treat-
ment of improvements. As Edmund Kitch has explained, patents typically 
claim an invention that “works” but is not necessarily one that is com-
mercially viable (Kitch 275-80). After the patent is granted, the patentee 
is given the exclusive right to tinker with and refine the invention, to see 
whether it can be made into something commercially viable. These fur-
ther improvements, even if they are themselves not sufficiently original to 
23
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warrant patent protection, also belong to the patentee–by accession as it 
were–because the patentee can block anyone else from using an invention 
that incorporates the patent. The doctrine of equivalents, which extends 
protection beyond the literal claims of the patent to include in addition 
anything that differs in modest ways from the claims, even more clearly 
incorporates the idea of accession (Merges and Nelson 865-66; Lemley 
1997, 1070).
4. Trademark Dilution. Trademark law has come to reflect the principle 
of accession, through the protection against dilution of famous marks. 
Originally, trademark protection attached only to particular distinctive 
marks used in connection with particular goods and services. The sys-
tem operated on the basis of first possession, as the first firm to “capture” 
consumer recognition of its mark in a particular market was awarded an 
exclusive right to use the mark in that market. As brand management be-
came increasingly important, however, firms sought and obtained from 
Congress a broader form of protection against dilution of famous marks 
(see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). This new protection has the effect of extending 
the scope of trademark protection beyond commercial uses actually cap-
tured to uses not captured but which have a close enough connection to a 
famous mark to do it potential harm (Long, 1034). In other words, famous 
marks are now recognized as having an accession-like power over any use 
of the mark having a close enough connection to the mark to affect its 
value as a mark.
5. Publicity. A final example from the realm of intellectual property, the 
right of publicity, can be thought of as nothing more than a bundle of ac-
cession rights. The right applies to celebrities who have a persona that has 
commercial value (Grady, 103). The celebrity herself is obviously in con-
trol of (“owns” or is in “possession” of) her persona. The right of publicity 
permits the celebrity (or in some states, her estate) to determine which, 
if any, commercial markets she wishes to enter to reap a commercial gain 
from her persona. Thus, Bette Midler can decide whether the sound of her 
voice can be used to help sell Fords on television (Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)), Arnold Schwarzenegger can decide whether 
his image can be used in a line of bobblehead dolls (Broder), and so forth. 
In each case, we can say that the secondary right—to use the image of the 
celebrity in a particular commercial market—is assigned by accession to 
the owner of the primary right—the right of the celebrity to control the 
persona itself.
27
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c. contested issues
Now that we have seen a variety of examples of the principle of accession 
at work, it is illuminating to consider some situations in which the law is 
uncertain about whether ownership of contested resources should be as-
signed by first possession or accession. Most of these situations involve 
fairly low-valued resources or issues that arise too infrequently to gener-
ate any iron-clad conclusions. Nevertheless, we see an unmistakable pull 
toward accession in these cases, particularly as the background condition 
becomes thicker with established property rights or as economic values be-
come greater.
1. Wild animals. Ownership of wild animals is one ground of contesta-
tion. Although American students are taught that first possession prevails 
here, there is in fact a competing principle–sometimes called ratione soli 
(by reason of the soil)–that awards rights to wild animals to the owner of 
the land on which they are killed or captured. England, with its large landed 
estates, was traditionally more receptive to this competing principle than 
America (Lueck, 1989). In the United States, a privilege of hunting on any 
unenclosed land was recognized early in many states (Goble and Freyfogle, 
133-140). But even in America, rights to certain wild animals, such as bees, 
have always been assigned to landowners rather than first possessors (see 
State v. Repp, 73 N.W. 829 (Ia. 1898)). Other wild animals that build homes 
in fixed locations, such as beavers and muskrats, as well as shellfish that 
grow in beds in fixed locations, are also more likely to fall under the prin-
ciple of ratione soli, which is to say, accession.
Even with respect to traditional animals, ferae naturae, American law 
over time has moved substantially toward accession. A rule of open access 
has given way to rules permitting landowners to exclude hunters either as a 
matter or law or by posting no hunting signs (Signon). As rural areas have 
become more settled, exclusion has come to dominate over open access. 
Access to wild animals today increasingly requires the permission of the 
owner of the soil, with the result that the principle of accession has in effect 
come to prevail rather than pure first possession.12
12 To be clear, the owner of the soil does not own any wild animals until they are captured on the 
land. The same is true of oil and gas and groundwater. Ownership of the land gives the surface 
owner an exclusive option to capture or to license others to capture fugitive resources on or 
under the land, but the fugitive resource must still be reduced to possession (by someone) 
before ownership attaches.
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2. Finders. Lost property provides another area of contestation. When 
a lost item is found, disputes often arise as to whether the found object 
belongs (in a qualified sense–the rights here are subordinate to the claims 
of the true owner) to the individual who makes the find or the owner of 
the locus in quo. This is another straightforward contest between first pos-
session and accession. Courts have had little trouble ruling for the owner 
of the locus in quo when the finder is trespassing or the item is attached 
to or buried beneath the soil (e.g., Favorite v. Miller, 407 A.2d 974 (Conn. 
1978); Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. 255 (1832)).13 The latter line of cases is 
reminiscent of the doctrine of fixtures and reveals again how the claim of 
the landowner takes on more gravitational force as connectedness with the 
soil becomes more pronounced.
American courts have pushed further in the direction of ruling for land-
owners in finders cases by applying the doctrine of mislaid property (see 
Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W. 2d 400 (Ia. 1995)). Items are 
mislaid when you deliberately put them down someplace and then forget 
them. Mislaid property always goes to the owner of the locus in quo. Because 
a significant portion of lost property can be characterized as mislaid, this 
doctrine moves a large number of cases from the first possession category 
over into the accession column.
3. Meterorites. Cases involving falling meteorites can also entail a com-
petition between the person who finds the meteorite and the owner of the 
land on which it falls. As a rule, the landowner wins, especially when the me-
teorite is buried in the soil (Goddard v. Winchell, 52 N.W. 1124 (Ia. 1892)). 
In 1954, in Sylacauga, Alabama, a meteorite crashed through the roof of a 
house; bounced off a radio sitting on a table; and struck the tenant, Ann E. 
Hodges, bruising her arm and hip. Litigation ensued between the landlord 
and the tenant over who had the better claim to the meteorite. Although 
the landlord claimed title as owner of the soil, the tenant claimed a special 
equity based on the fact that the meteorite struck her. Eventually, the land-
lord settled on terms permitting Hodges to retain possession (Merrill and 
Smith, 2007, 233-34). Although this could be construed as a preference for 
the first possessor (if being struck qualifies as possession), it can also be 
viewed as a dispute over which of two persons with an interest in the locus 
in quo had a better claim to accession.
13 Some jurisdictions treat embedded items as a separate category, justifying an award to the 
landowner (Gerstenblith, 591-92). 
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4. Street parking. If hunting is important to rural residents, then parking 
is a matter of first magnitude for urban residents. Parking on public streets 
is generally allocated on the basis of first possession, and this remains the 
dominant rule (Epstein 2002). Nevertheless, as urban parking space be-
comes increasingly scarce, cities are turning to systems in which only cars 
displaying permits are allowed to park on the street. These permits are 
nearly always allocated to those who own or occupy property on the street 
in question. In other words, the right to park is given by accession to those 
who live or work on the street. These permit systems reveal how conditions 
of general scarcity can cause a system of allocation based on first possession 
to be replaced by one based on the principle of accession.
5. Domain names. A final, and particularly instructive, example con-
cerns the assignment of domain names on the Internet. With regard to 
the Internet, in the beginning all the world was indeed America. That is, 
the background condition was widely regarded as one vast cyberspace, in 
which rights to things like domain names would be assigned by first pos-
session. At first, the allocation followed the first possession script, as the ini-
tial contractor responsible for issuing domain names, Network Solutions, 
Inc. (NSI), simply issued names on a first-come, first-served basis. Soon 
wily characters began acquiring domain names that corresponded to trade-
marks or trade names of established entities which had been slow to recog-
nize the value of the Internet. Some of these first possessors offered to sell 
the laggard entities the rights to use their own trade names on the Internet, 
a practice known as cybersquatting.
A number of these entities elected to sue, claiming that the practice of 
cybersquatting constitutes either trademark infringement or trademark 
dilution. The courts agreed, holding that owners of property rights es-
tablished in traditional commercial channels—trademarks—could extend 
those rights to the new environment of the Internet, notwithstanding the 
formal adoption of a rule of first possession as the mode of assignment of 
names for that new environment (see, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); TCPIP Holding Co., 
Inc., v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001)). Congress 
quickly ratified this result by enacting the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). It is now well-established that prin-
ciples of trademark law trump the first-come, first-served registration 
rules of the Internet. This is a dramatic example of the principle of ac-
cession superseding first possession. It suggests that when the economic 
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stakes are sufficiently high, accession can replace first possession in fairly 
short order.
d. the ubiquity of Accession
Many of the instantiations of the principle of accession we have canvassed 
have been ignored by property scholars, apparently on the grounds that 
they are too quaint, quirky, or inconsequential to warrant our attention. 
And there has been no discussion of the possibility that they might reflect 
a more general principle of property law. Yet after we state the principle at 
a sufficient level of generality, we can see applications of accession popping 
up throughout the law. This in turn suggests that the specific instantiations 
I have reviewed are simply the tip of the iceberg of a much more general 
phenomenon about property rights—one so pervasive and general that it 
escapes our everyday notice.
Generalizing further, we can see that the principle of accession works 
all the time to allocate new resources and increments in value to particular 
owners of property. Suppose A owns a large tank of oil and world oil prices 
skyrocket. No one questions that A also “owns” the windfall reflected in the 
enhanced value of the oil in the tank. The relationship is so prominent that 
accession is applied without thinking about it. Or suppose B owns a hard-
scrabble farm and a nearby city grows to the point where the farm is sud-
denly valuable for subdivision. No one doubts that B “owns” the windfall 
gain in terms of the development value of the farm. Again, the relationship 
is so prominent it goes without question. When the connection between 
some new value and existing property is close, we automatically assign the 
new value to the connected property without giving it any thought. The 
various doctrines in the accession family come into play only when there 
is enough separation between the primary and derivative asset that there 
is some ground for contestation about how rights to the derivative asset 
should be allocated.
The basic point is that property law includes as a central design feature 
the owner’s routine capture of all increments in value that are prominently 
connected with the owned asset. With respect to most increments in value, 
most of the time, this design feature operates silently and without con-
troversy. Only when a new increment in value has a somewhat attenuated 
connection with the asset, or when the new increment in value takes a form 
that allows us to think of it as a separate asset, do we turn to one of the 
family of doctrines that comprise the principle of accession to establish 
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whether the owner of the primary asset also owns the derivative asset. In 
this respect, the principle of accession is visible mostly in unusual cases, but 
consideration of the operation and function of the principle allows us to 
see that it is really quite ordinary—and fundamental.
3.   first possession And Acession:  common feAtures
In this Part, I consider briefly how first possession and accession comple-
ment each other in establishing a system of property rights. Both principles 
operate to identify unique persons as owners of particular resources. More-
over, both principles perform this function in a way that imposes minimal 
informational demands on members of society. These shared features cre-
ate the conditions that permit free alienation of resources, so that scarce 
things can be assigned and reassigned until they end up in the hands of 
those who can extract the most value from them.
A. conceptual connections
Notwithstanding the differences between first possession and accession, 
they also share certain important attributes. Both can be seen as particu-
lar conceptions of a more generic concept of possession. The concept of 
possession relates to the idea of being in control of some thing. First pos-
session can be said to select out circumstances where some person is suf-
ficiently close to being in control of a previously unowned thing as to be 
“in possession” of it. Accession can be said to select out the circumstances 
where some existing property owner is sufficiently capable of controlling a 
previously unowned thing as to be “in possession” of it. In both contexts, 
declaring someone to be “in possession” is closer to saying that she has an 
exclusive right to control some thing than to saying she is in fact in control 
of the thing.
One can also argue that first possession and accession presuppose each 
other. Accession works only when other property rights already exist. 
Accession therefore cannot explain how the first property rights come into 
being. If we start with a condition in which most resources are unowned, 
then arguably the first stage in establishing ownership will be dominated 
by something like first possession, and only after significant ownership 
has been established can we switch, in a second stage, to something like 
accession.
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Yet if accession requires first possession, first possession can be said to 
presuppose a version of accession. This is because first possession is also 
based on a prominent connection between two resources—namely, the 
connection between the labor or other exertions of the first possessor and 
the thing reduced to possession (Smith, 2007, 1766-77). Locke’s theory of 
the original ownership, for example, uses accession-like language in ex-
plaining why mixing labor with objects initially held in common produces 
ownership (Locke 287-302). Locke assumes that the labor is an asset that is 
“owned” by the first possessor and that the “labour makes the far greatest 
part of the value of things” reduced to possession (id. 297). This sounds 
like accession: awarding ownership to the contested resource based on its 
prominent connection to some already-owned resource. In the Lockean ac-
count of the origins of property, therefore, we can say that accession oper-
ates at the first stage in establishing ownership, and first possession comes 
in at a second stage.
None of this is to suggest that first possession and accession are the same 
thing. As discussed in Part III, there are important institutional differences 
between first possession and accession. Still, they have a significant degree 
of conceptual affinity.
B. unique Assignment
First possession is often praised as a mechanism for transferring resources 
from an open access state into private property rights. As Richard Epstein 
has written (Epstein 1987, 415): “With respect to land and chattels, there is 
no obvious assignment of any external things to any particular individual. 
In this context the first possession rule at common law allows persons to 
come forward and become single owners of external things.” The virtue of 
first possession, on these accounts, is the virtue of private property more 
generally. First possession is a beneficial institution because it establishes 
particular persons as the exclusive owners of particular things (cf. Heller).
As should be clear, however, first possession holds no advantage over 
accession in this regard. Accession also transforms resources that are un-
owned or are of doubtful ownership into private property. Moreover, like 
first possession, accession assigns ownership uniquely, in a winner-take-
all fashion. Accession follows a different logic in identifying the singular 
owner. Under first possession, the race for each resource is assumed to have 
a single winner. Either Pierson or Post gets the fox; they are not awarded 
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title as tenants in common.14 But accession also assigns rights to contested 
resources in a winner-take-all fashion. Prominent connection is an ordinal 
concept, such that one thing is (nearly) always more prominently connect-
ed to some other thing than is any other thing. In the usual case, we can tell 
as soon as a new or an unclaimed resource emerges which existing asset has 
the most prominent connection to the new resource. Thus prominent con-
nection, like first possession, has the capacity to generate unique solutions 
to the question who is the owner.
In short, insofar as it is socially beneficial to have a mechanism for as-
signing unique gatekeeper-owners to particular resources, there is no basis 
for preferring first possession to accession, or vice versa, in terms of the 
ultimate results they achieve. Both distribute scarce or otherwise valuable 
resources in a one-person-one-resource fashion, thereby creating a system 
of decentralized gatekeeper rights that is the hallmark of property.
c. information costs
A system for establishing property rights must do more than identify unique 
owners of particular resources. It must also do this in a way that imposes 
only a modest informational burden on the members of society. As Henry 
Smith and I have stressed in a variety of writings, the nature of property as 
an institution makes information costs critical (Merrill and Smith, 2000; 
Merrill and Smith 2001). Property rights are rights in particular things that 
are held against “all the world”; they are in rem. This feature of property 
places potentially enormous informational demands on society. Property 
rights create duties of abstention that must be observed by a large num-
ber of unconnected persons, many of whom are legally unsophisticated. If 
these duties of abstention required the application of subtle distinctions, 
extensive fact finding, and frequent recourse to adjudication, property 
rights would never get off the ground. If we are to have property at all, the 
basic concepts must be ones that a third-grader can grasp with little con-
scious reflection—concepts like “keep off!” and “don’t take!”
In this institutional setting, the rules for establishing original owner-
ship of things must also be simple, intuitive, and easy to grasp. Such rules 
14 Academic commentators are more sympathetic to splitting entitlements (see, e.g., Helmholz; 
Rubenfeld). Dale Mortensen has used game theory to show that splitting entitlements among 
contestants generally results in suboptimal search effort (Mortensen). But he also concurs in 
the view, to be considered momentarily, that awarding all of the entitlement to the winning 
contestant under a rule of first possession can result in excessive search effort (over-racing). 
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must not only generate unique solutions, but they also must be capable 
of self-application in most cases without the intervention of state offi-
cials. They must be solutions that enjoy widespread consensus (Merrill 
and Smith, 2007a).
First possession satisfies these general requirements. The idea that being 
first to claim some thing confers an entitlement to that thing relative to all 
others is both intuitive and widely adopted. Queuing for taxis, volunteer-
ing in class, and taking numbers at the deli counter are familiar examples. 
The actions that constitute claiming vary by context and require a shared 
understanding of meaning between the claimant and the audience, includ-
ing competitors (Rose, 1985, 82-85; Smith, 2003, 1115-22). But the concept 
remains easy to grasp, even if the applications vary in accordance with the 
customs of different resource users.
Importantly, the principle of accession–which assigns ownership based 
on prominent connection to existing property–also satisfies the general 
information cost constraints for establishing original ownership. There is 
usually ready agreement about what thing is most prominently connected 
to some other thing. Why this is so is not entirely clear. Human psychology 
is one possible explanation. Social convention is another.
The philosopher David Hume offered a psychological explanation for 
what he saw as the universal force of the principle of accession. Hume 
was especially fascinated by the observation that prominent connection 
seems always to run from great to little objects rather than the other way 
around. He wrote, “[t]he empire of Great Britain seems to draw along with 
it the dominion of the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the Isle of Man, and the isle 
of Wright; but the authority over those lesser islands does not naturally 
imply any title to Great Britain” (Hume, 510 n.2). As to the factors that de-
termine which of two objects is great and which is little, Hume saw many 
candidates with possible appeal to the human imagination. “One part of 
a compound object may become more considerable than another, either 
because it is more constant and durable; because it is of greater value; 
because it is more obvious and remarkable; because it is of greater extent; 
or because its existence is more separate and independent” (id.). These 
potential defining factors, he conceded, can be “conjoin’d and oppos’d in 
all the different ways, and according to all the different degrees, which can 
be imagined” (id.).
There is almost certainly something to the idea that prominent connec-
tion is hard-wired in the psychology of human perception. One only has 
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to read judicial decisions declaring that mirrors attached to the wall with 
screws are fixtures whereas mirrors hanging from the wall by hooks are 
not (see Strain v. Green, 172 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1946)), to begin thinking that 
there must be strong psychological forces that equate physical connected-
ness with ownership.
Robert Sugden has offered a neo-Humean account of how acces-
sion generates unique solutions to questions of ownership (Sugden 94). 
Sugden’s account is embedded in a more general theory about how social 
conflicts are resolved by conventions developed over time that generate 
positive sum outcomes. One reason such conventions emerge, he suggests, 
is that certain solutions have a natural “prominence” that makes them fo-
cal points for coordination. Sugden illustrates the importance of promi-
nence by describing a simple game he asked experimental subjects to play, 
presented in Figure 1 (id. 94).
Contestants who play this game nearly always select as the point of 
coordination the white dot just above and to the right of the black dot, 
which is closest in terms of physical proximity to the black dot. Other 
choices are logically possible, such as the dot directly below the black dot 
or the dot in the upper-right corner, which is farthest away from the black 
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dot. But Sugden reports that these dots are rarely chosen. The explana-
tion, of course, is that these choices have much less “prominence” than 
the closest dot.
Sugden grounds accession not in human psychology but in a theory of 
the evolution of social conventions. This includes as one of its elements 
functionality—the generation of stable positive sum solutions—which can 
account for why something like the principle of accession becomes reflect-
ed in law and why it has staying power. Sugden stresses that the evolution-
ary process that produces stable conventions will favor not only unique 
solutions, but also what he calls “cheat-proof” rules (id. 101). This he says 
counts “against conventions–however much we might approve of them 
from a moral point of view–that are subtle or subjective, or that require 
fine judgments” (id. 100). This too seems an apt characterization of most 
of the doctrines that reflect the principle of accession.
Whatever the ultimate explanation for perceptions of prominent con-
nection, it seems clear that prominent connection allows us to assign own-
ership in a way that is easy to understand, is self-applying, and generates 
very little conflict. Accession thus functions in a manner analogous to 
other bright line rules of property law, such as the rules against unlicensed 
boundary crossings of land or asportations of chattels. These rules estab-
lish principles of resource management that are simple, intuitive, and self-
applying–and hence operate with very low information costs.
4.  first possession And Acession: differentiAting feAtures
If accession shares important conceptual and institutional features with 
first possession, it also reflects important differences. Let us begin by seek-
ing to specify these points of differentiation more precisely. After we have 
done that, we will be in a position to account for the widespread use of 
accession in establishing ownership and explain why accession seems to 
dominate first possession when both are potential options for resolving 
who owns what.
A. conceptual distinctions
As previously discussed, first possession and accession have a family resem-
blance in that both are related to the concept of possession. Yet they are also 
different. Two points of contrast are particularly important.
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One concerns the assumed background condition against which these 
concepts operate. First possession assumes that the assignment of rights 
occurs against a background condition largely free of existing property 
rights–an open access common or the public domain. The hunter stalks 
wild game through a dense forest; the fisher casts her line in the ocean; 
the inventor seeks a patentable discovery in a world in which ideas are in 
the public domain. True, first possession is sometimes used to regulate be-
havior on owned property. The assignment of seats in movie theaters or 
parking spaces in shopping center parking lots are examples (cf. Ellickson 
1991). Even here, however, it is possible to conceive of the situation as one 
in which an owner of property has deliberately decided to place some at-
tribute of that property “in the public domain,” in the sense that the at-
tribute is up for grabs by various contenders (Barzel 16-32). Thus, these 
examples do not refute the notion that there is a close connection between 
the concept of first possession and the idea of open access. If anything, they 
confirm it.
Accession, by contrast, assumes a background condition populated by 
existing property rights. The commons of first possession disappears and 
is replaced by a background in which most things of value have already 
been assigned to some owner. When new resources are discovered or new 
increments in value emerge, we look around to see which existing property 
owner is the most logical one (the most “prominently connected” one) to 
whom to assign the new resource or value.
A second significant point of differentiation is that first possession re-
quires the performance of some act to establish ownership–the act deemed 
to establish possession. This ordinarily means that some actual exploitation 
of the resource must have occurred before ownership attaches. The fish 
must be pulled from the sea, the wild animal must be killed or captured, 
the novel expression must be embodied in a tangible medium, and so forth. 
Actual possession or control might not be strictly required in all circum-
stances. Sometimes hot pursuit or the equivalent is sufficient to establish 
first possession (Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1805)).15 Still, 
one must engage in the act of hot pursuit, and only after this has been ac-
complished is ownership established.
15 One modern salvage case permits first possession to be established by videotaping the sunken 
vessel (Columbus-America Discovery Group, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th 
Cir. 1992)).
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Accession, by contrast, awards ownership based on status–the status of 
owning something prominently connected to the disputed object. There is 
no need to engage in any performative act that demonstrates one is in pos-
session of the object; ownership follows automatically based on the status 
of being an existing owner. To be sure, prominent connection can plausibly 
be regarded as a proxy for capability to possess or exercise control over 
the contested resource. In this sense, accession can be said to select out 
the circumstances that allow us to assign some thing to the owner of some 
other thing who has the strongest claim to be able to control the thing, and 
hence to be “in possession” of it. But the fact remains that under accession 
actual possession is not required; nor is actual exploitation of the resource 
required.16
One could go further and maintain that accession is not a principle about 
the initial acquisition of property rights so much as a principle about the 
scope of property rights already acquired. Many accession rights, especially 
those associated with land, seem to clarify what is it that the owner has the 
right to exclude others from. For example, accession tells us that the owner 
of land can also exclude others from interfering with crops, fixtures attached 
to the land, minerals discovered under the surface, and so forth. Similarly, 
many accession rights in intellectual property can be seen as clarification of 
the scope of the rights conferred. Accession tells us that a copyright owner 
can exclude others not only from copying the work, but also from prepar-
ing a derivative work based on the copyrighted work, and that a trademark 
owner can exclude others not only from using a trademark, but also from 
takings action that would dilute the value of the trademark.
I would resist this characterization of accession. Accession often applies 
to determine the ownership of objects that are most naturally regarded as 
being separate or distinct from the thing that supplies the basis for acces-
sion, such as baby animals, minerals underground, or screenplays for mov-
ies. Nevertheless, even if we assume accession is about the scope of rights, 
it still functions as a means of establishing original title to the objects to 
which it applies. The title to certain things–baby animals, crops, minerals, 
16 One might think that the doctrine the Romans called specificatio is an exception to this gen-
eralization, in that title is awarded based on labor, which is a type of action. But the labor 
required is not for purposes of establishing actual possession of the thing. If the laborer has 
supplied the greater value and has significantly transformed the object, the laborer will be 
awarded title to the object by accession–regardless of whether the laborer is in possession of 
the thing. The labor required is for the purpose of establishing the status of prominent con-
nection, not for demonstrating actual possession.
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interest earned on a fund, derivative works, and so forth–finds its root in 
accession, whether we think of this as a principle of original ownership 
or a principle about the scope of property rights. The question of proper 
characterization here does not appear to make any difference in terms of 
institutional analysis. The two points of distinction I have emphasized–the 
assumption about the background condition of rights and whether the as-
signment is based on act or status–remain fully relevant to that evaluation 
without regard to how we characterize the distinction.
B. the pathologies of first possession
Although economists and lawyers influenced by economics have applaud-
ed first possession for transforming unowned resources into private prop-
erty, they have had many harsh things to say about the manner in which 
first possession accomplishes this task (e.g., Haddock 791). The critique 
of first possession can be pieced together from two types of commentary. 
One deals with traditional natural resources problems: fisheries, grazing 
commons, homesteading, and the like. The other deals with intellectual 
property rights, where exclusion rights are conceived as being carved out 
of a public domain in which access is open and unlimited. Taken together, 
these sources suggest that first possession suffers from four pathologies: (1) 
wasteful consumption of resources through competition for the prize of 
ownership; (2) premature exploitation or overconsumption of resources 
(the “tragedy of the commons”); (3) inadequate incentives to cultivate or 
improve resources; and (4) unfavorable conditions for securing agreements 
for collective governance of resources. Assigning original ownership based 
on accession largely eliminates each of these pathologies. In explaining why 
this is so, I will occasionally speak of the accession-creating property as the 
primary resource or right and the property assigned by accession as the 
derivative resource or right.
1. Wasteful Races. Any system that establishes a race open to all can end 
up wasting valuable resources. No contestant will have an incentive to 
spend more on the race than the value of the prize. But each contestant 
might have an incentive to outspend the other contestants, provided the 
additional expenditures can make the difference between winning and los-
ing. In the limit, each contestant can spend up to the value of the prize 
in an effort to out-compete the others. If there are multiple contestants, 
the expenditures incurred by the losers are a deadweight loss. Under the 
right conditions, the race may end up consuming more resources than it 
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produces, making it a negative proposition from the perspective of social 
efficiency. This analysis has been applied to land races, patent races, and 
the quest for prizes and economic rents more generally (Anderson and Hill 
1990; Barzel 1968; Grady and Alexander; Tullock).
Using accession rather than first possession to assign original ownership 
largely eliminates the waste inherent in racing to secure resource owner-
ship. Under accession, the prize in the form of the derivative resource is 
awarded to the owner of the primary resource. Provided only one claimant 
satisfies the conditions for accession, there will be no rent-dissipating race 
(Abramowicz; Grady). Of course, in some cases disputes might arise over 
the identity of the primary resource or who is the owner of the primary 
resource. But on the whole, the potential for rent-dissipating competition 
among rival claimants should be greatly reduced under accession relative 
to first possession.
Dean Lueck’s work on the economics of first possession effectively con-
firms this point (Lueck 1995). One of Lueck’s principal findings is that the 
degree of waste associated with first possession is a function of the extent 
to which competitors are homogeneous or heterogeneous in terms of their 
ability to secure the prize. The more heterogeneous the competitors, the 
more likely that one will win the race quickly and limit the degree of waste-
ful racing engaged in by the others. He writes, “In the extreme case, where 
just one person has costs less than the net present value of the asset’s flows, 
the first-best outcome is achieved. In this case, only one person finds it 
worthwhile to enter the race, so there is no dissipation” (id. 400). This es-
sentially describes the situation achieved by switching to a rule of acces-
sion. Under accession, only one person is uniquely situated to “race” for 
the new asset. This is not because this person has a unique cost advantage 
relative to other competitors (although this might also be true), but rather 
because the legal rule grants him an exclusive right to acquire the asset. The 
result is the same: the wasteful dissipation associated with first possession 
is eliminated.
2. Commons Tragedies. As we have seen, first possession presupposes a 
background condition in which resources are held in an open access com-
mons. Depending on the nature of the resource, this gives rise to a danger 
of premature exploitation or overconsumption which goes by the familiar 
moniker “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin; Fennell). The tragedy can 
occur because the open access status creates a pervasive problem of cost ex-
ternalization. Suppose 100 fishing boats are plying a bay. If boat A succeeds 
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in catching a fish, the benefits of the catch are fully internalized to boat A. 
But the costs of the catch, in terms of foregone opportunities to catch fish, 
are spread over all 100 boats in the bay. So boat A incurs only 1/100 of the 
opportunity costs of the capture, and the other 99/100 of those costs is 
externalized to the other boats. From the perspective of each of the boats, 
the calculus is the same: benefits fully internalized and costs mostly exter-
nalized. This sets up a dynamic in which each boat has an incentive to grab 
as many fish as quickly as possible and overall consumption can spiral out 
of control. If the resource is finite and especially if it is sensitive to destruc-
tion if taken before maturity or beyond sustainable levels, the result can be 
complete extinction of the resource.17
Using accession to award ownership to resources largely eliminates the 
tragedy of the commons. Under accession, both the benefits and costs asso-
ciated with consumption of the derivative resource are internalized by the 
owner of the primary resource (Cooter and Ulen, 131). To continue with 
the fishing example, suppose we assign exclusive rights to fish a portion of 
the bay to the owners of riparian land around the perimeter of the bay as an 
exclusive economic zone appurtenant to the land. These exclusive aquatic 
territories are then enclosed with containment barriers and dedicated to 
fish farming. Now, each time the riparian owner removes a fish from the 
containment, she realizes 100 percent of the benefits and 100 percent of the 
costs from this action. As a result, we would expect owners to avoid taking 
fish before they are fully grown and to limit their consumption of the re-
source to rates that ensure a sustainable yield.
3. Incentives for Cultivation. Because first possession conceives of the 
background condition as one of open access, any regime of first posses-
sion will also provide inadequate incentives for participants to cultivate, 
improve, or otherwise invest in the underlying pool from which resources 
are drawn (Demsetz; Bohn and Deacon). Analytically speaking, this point 
is the same as the last one, except that the emphasis is now on disincen-
tives to provide external benefits rather than incentives to impose external 
costs. Potential competitors for resources drawn from an open access com-
mons have little incentive to stock the commons or otherwise cultivate or 
replenish it because all other competitors for the assets in the pool will 
likewise capture these benefits. For example, no individual fisher has much 
17 There is ample empirical evidence that the problem is a serious one, certainly with respect to 
fisheries (UN Food and Ag. Org.; Wyman). 
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incentive to build a fish hatchery to replenish the stock of fish in an open 
access fishery; all the other fishers in the area will also be able to capture the 
new supply of fish.
Accession solves this problem by assigning ownership of the derivative 
resource to the owner of the primary resource, thereby ensuring that the 
owner of the primary resource will capture all benefits created by invest-
ment in the primary resource.18 We see this quite literally in a number of 
accession doctrines, including increase; the crop rules; specificatio, the rule 
that interest follows principal; the adaptation right in copyright; and so 
forth. In each instance, the rule ensures that the owner of the primary re-
source will be able to “reap where he has sown” by also claiming ownership 
over the derivative resource.
The point can be further illustrated by Kitch’s prospect theory of patents. 
Patents have long been conceived of as prizes awarded to the first person to 
capture a particular useful and original idea. Kitch asked in effect: Why is 
the prize awarded in the form of an exclusive property right to the inven-
tion, rather than a cash reward or an honorific? His answer was that the 
property right gives the inventor the incentive to invest further in develop-
ment of the invention: to make further improvements in it, to negotiate 
with other patent holders for complementary rights, to establish a system 
of distribution, and to bring the invention to the attention of the public. In 
other words, by giving the patent holder (the primary resource owner) an 
exclusive right to derivative resources (improvements secured by contract-
ing and other commercialization efforts), the law allows the inventor to 
make additional investments that will enhance the value of the invention, 
knowing that he will be able to internalize any and all benefits that flow 
from these additional investments. This is the logic of accession.19
4. Governance Costs. A final criticism leveled against first possession is 
that it increases the costs of contracting among the respective claimants to 
achieve any type of mutually advantageous forbearance or other collective 
action. This criticism again flows from the open access nature of the back-
ground condition that first possession takes as a given. Bob Ellickson has 
18 Empirical studies show that privately owned oyster beds have higher productivity than open 
access oyster beds (De Alessi 98-99). 
19 Mark Lemley derides this rationale for intellectual property as “ex post,” which he says is “anti-
market” (Lemley, 2004). But this critique would seem to apply equally to private ownership of 
agricultural land, insofar as it is justified by the incentive structure it creates to cultivate, har-
vest, and market crops. It is odd to characterize incentive effects as “ex post” or “anti-market.”
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made the point by describing the advantages of parcelization for managing 
land (Ellickson 1993, 1322-35). In an open access regime, even a “small 
event” like growing a tomato plant is difficult to regulate because it is nec-
essary to secure the agreement of all other participants to forbear from 
taking or trampling the plant. Similarly, a “medium event” like building a 
small dam will be nearly impossible to accomplish, given the need to secure 
unanimous consent not to interfere with the dam or appropriate its value. 
Both types of action can be achieved much more easily if the commons is 
parcelized and each participant is given exclusive rights over a single parcel. 
In the case of the small event, no contractual agreement is required at all. 
A single owner-gatekeeper can decide to grow and tend the plant without 
needing the cooperation of anyone else. With respect to the medium event, 
contracting is now more feasible because only a small number of individ-
ual owners are affected by the project. If their consent can be secured, the 
project can go forward. Only when we turn to “large events,” like wide-
spread air pollution, do we find little ground for preferring parcelization to 
open access because both seem to present difficult problems for collective 
governance.
Here again, we can see that accession, in a fashion analogous to par-
celization, reduces transaction costs and hence makes collective decision-
making easier to achieve. Accession, like parcelization, assigns particular 
resources (new or derivative ones) to the owner of other resources (existing 
primary ones). This too has the effect of assigning particular resources to 
specific owner-gatekeepers and is inexpensive and (usually) unambiguous. 
When accession operates to determine ownership of derivative resources, 
governance can be achieved for most issues—Ellickson’s small and medium 
events—by delegation or contract among the affected parties.
5. What about Lotteries or Auctions? The foregoing advantages of ac-
cession are attributable to the two differentiating features of accession 
described in subpart A—namely, that accession does not assume a back-
ground condition of open access and awards ownership based on status 
rather than the performance of some act. In theory, there is no reason the 
relevant status must be a prominent connection to some existing prop-
erty. The same cost savings relative to first possession could be obtained 
by adopting any strategy based on “tying” the new resource to some exist-
ing status.20 We could award new resources to the wealthiest person in the 
20 I am indebted to Robert Cooter for pressing this point on me.
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community, we could award new resources to the poorest person in the 
community, or we could auction them to the highest bidder.21 Why do 
the various rules that make up the accession family avoid these sorts of 
options, favoring instead the status of having a prominent connection to 
some existing property?
The answer has already been anticipated in Part II: prominent con-
nection generates unique outcomes with minimal information in a way 
that makes accession largely self-applying. It is difficult to see any other 
principle for tying new resources to status that would have these features. 
Awarding new resources to existing owners by lottery would likely generate 
extensive efforts to influence the structure of the lottery and would mul-
tiply transaction costs because winners would typically sell their rights to 
others who are better situated to take advantage of them.22 Auctions of new 
resources have been proposed in some contexts, such as patents, and have 
even been adopted in others, such as broadcast spectrum rights. But there is 
ample reason to believe that auctions entail administrative costs that dwarf 
those of assigning rights based on prominent connection to existing rights 
(Abramowicz 2007). In other words, virtually any alternative assignment 
principle would entail extensive collective action problems. This would in-
evitably raise concerns about rent-seeking and the consumption of signifi-
cant resources in arguing about the design and the implementation of the 
alternative system. The resources gained in avoiding the pathologies of first 
possession would be lost, at least in part, through the costs expended in 
fine-tuning the mechanism for assigning original rights.23
21 Access to wildlife in early English law was limited to wealthy landowners, without regard to 
whether the wildlife was captured on their land (Lund). Broadcast frequencies were originally 
assigned by first possession, then by costly comparative hearings under a public interest stan-
dard, and today are generally awarded by auctioning them to the highest bidder (Hazlett). 
22 This is suggested by the experience of the FCC in awarding cellular telephone licenses by lot-
tery. For background and an illustration of some of the interminable disputes this generated, 
see Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
23 Blackstone speculated that the right of inheritance might have originated in accession-like 
thinking. He thought that inheritance was grounded in the prominent physical connection 
between the deceased owner and the next of kin gathered around the death bed (Blackstone 
Vol. 2, *11-12). Whatever the accuracy of this speculation, it suggests a simple rationale for 
inheritance analogous to the case for accession relative to more elaborate rules for assigning 
ownership of assets: Passing property upon death to the next of kin eliminates the manipula-
tion and intrigue that would accompany other possible rules for the transmission of property 
upon death and thus eliminates the drain on resources that these other methods would likely 
entail. 
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In short, if we want to capture the efficiency gains of accession relative 
to first possession, the low-cost method for achieving this objective is to 
award new resources to existing owners based on prominent connection.
c. selecting fit owners
Another way to think about the comparison between first possession and 
accession is in terms of the standards they incorporate for selecting original 
owners. As noted in Part II, both first possession and accession assign re-
sources to unique claimants, and they do so in a low-cost way that is largely 
self-applying. One virtue of these features is that private property rights 
are quickly established. In modern property systems, moreover, the rights 
established under either principle are typically freely alienable. Thus, if 
the original owner turns out to be someone who is not particularly well-
qualified to make effective use of the resource, she can sell or give it to 
someone else who might be better able to exploit it.
If transaction costs were zero, this process of transfer of rights would 
continue until the person who can make the highest and best use of the re-
source becomes the owner. In reality, of course, transaction costs are always 
positive. Thus, all things being equal, it makes sense to have the original 
assignment of ownership go to someone who is likely to make effective use 
of the resource. This will get us off to a good start in making valuable use 
of the resource and will eliminate the need for at least some subsequent 
transfers, thus saving the costs of making these transfers.24 It is important 
to consider, therefore, how first possession and accession compare as meth-
ods for selecting owners of resources.
First possession and accession adopt very different strategies for select-
ing original owners. First possession uses a strategy of competition. Various 
claimants race each other to determine who will be the first to engage in 
the performative act that qualifies as being in possession. Competition is 
a tried-and-true method of determining fitness. Firms compete for busi-
ness, sports teams compete for championships, and students compete for 
admission to elite schools. Competition is of course not an infallible guide 
to picking the fittest owner in any given context. Sometimes the winner is 
just lucky. The relationship between winning and fitness is probabilistic. 
24 Coase made an analogous point about the content of nuisance law. If neighbors cannot cost-
lessly transact to resolve a nuisance dispute, nuisance law should try to anticipate the outcome 
the parties would agree upon if they could transact (Coase 16-19). 
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Still, it is plausible to think that competition is generally a good way to pick 
owners who will be fit. Over a broad range of cases, those who are the most 
skilled and put the most effort into the competition are more likely to win 
than those who are unskilled and indolent.
Accession adopts a different strategy for picking fit owners. Instead of 
holding a competition, ownership is awarded to someone who has already 
demonstrated that she has the capacity to function as the owner of some 
prominently connected asset. We can call this strategy for selecting own-
ers a competence strategy. There are three reasons owners of prominently 
connected property are likely to be competent to serve as owners of new 
resources. First, if someone already owns property, we know she has some 
capital that can be drawn upon to develop the new resource, if only to 
pledge as collateral for a loan. Other potential candidates for an award of 
the new resource, such as the winner of a competition or someone chosen 
by lot, might not have access to any capital. Second, the most prominently 
connected owner is likely to have physical access to the resource. Other can-
didates for ownership, including even the richest person in the community, 
might not be able to develop the new resource because he is barred by in-
tervening rights holders from gaining access to it. Third, the most promi-
nently connected owner is likely to have specialized or local knowledge or 
skills relevant to developing the resource. Other claimants are less likely to 
have such knowledge or skills.
To illustrate these points, consider a problem confronted by a number of 
American cities early in their development: how to assign ownership to new 
land created by landfilling along the waterfront. A number of principles can 
be imagined, including first possession, sale by auction, and retention of 
ownership by the government. In New York City, however, the general prac-
tice was to give preferential rights to the owners of land immediately adja-
cent to these newly created “waterlots,” in other words, to award the land 
by accession (Hartog 44-68).25 This was controversial and often denounced 
as a form of corruption. But it had all the advantages noted previously. By 
awarding the waterlot to the adjacent owner, the city ensured that the land 
would be controlled by someone who had access to some capital, based on 
his existing ownership of land. The use of accession also ensured that the 
waterlot would go to someone who had physical access to the land; indeed, 
25 By contrast, in Chicago landfill along the lake front was largely retained as government prop-
erty, due to the influence of the public trust doctrine (Kearney and Merrill). 
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the adjacent owner might be the only person who had access to the water-
lot by land (as opposed to by water). And the use of accession meant that 
the waterlot was assigned to someone who was likely to have specialized 
knowledge and skills relevant to developing the new land. If the adjacent 
land had been used as a dock or wharf (a likely scenario), the owner would 
know how to develop the new waterlot as a dock or wharf.
Which is the better rule for picking fit owners: first possession or acces-
sion? It all depends. The difference here between first possession and acces-
sion is analogous to that between bid and no-bid contracts. Often it makes 
sense to award a contract based on competitive bidding. This is especially 
likely to be true if the good is relatively homogenous, performance is easy 
to monitor, there are no critical synergies with other contracts, and time 
is not of the essence. Other times it makes more sense to award a contract 
without competitive bidding. This is likely to be true if one firm has unique 
qualifications, performance is difficult to monitor (making firm reputation 
important), there are interconnections with other contracts already in ef-
fect, and time is of the essence. Thus, it is impossible to say that one strategy 
is inevitably superior to the other, such that either first possession or acces-
sion should be preferred as a matter of institutional design.
The tradeoffs can be further illustrated by considering which principle is 
best in terms of stimulating innovation. First possession is sometimes tout-
ed by intellectual property scholars as a basis for awarding rights to follow-
on inventions because it is thought to promote higher rates of continuing 
innovation (Merges and Nelson; Lemley 1997; Duffy). The argument is that 
first possession—awarding the rights to the follow-on improvement to the 
first person to discover the improvement—will bring on the spur of com-
petition, and this will translate into greater inventive activity than giving 
the rights to follow-on improvements to the holder of the original patent. 
In contrast, these scholars worry, broad accession-like rights, such as those 
endorsed by Kitch’s prospect theory, will have the effect of inducing com-
placency about innovation.
But the question of whether first possession is more of a spur to innova-
tion than accession turns on some of the same contextual factors consid-
ered previously that are relevant in determining whether competition or 
competence is a better basis for determining fitness. For example, if the 
innovation is not closely entwined with the original invention, the stimulus 
of competition might be better. If the innovation is closely connected with, 
and requires detailed knowledge of, the original innovation, competence 
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might be more important. A single answer is unlikely to be correct in all 
circumstances.
Merges and Nelson have developed evidence from the history of patent 
law that seems to suggest that awarding rights to follow-on improvements 
by first possession does result in a more rapid rate of technological prog-
ress than awarding rights to follow-on improvements by accession (Merges 
and Nelson; see also Wu). Specifically, they show that in industries in which 
pioneering patents have been construed broadly—and hence include many 
follow-on improvements—development has occurred more slowly than in 
industries in which pioneering patents have been construed narrowly.
But the effect Merges and Nelson measure can be due to the fact that 
the very breadth of the pioneering patents meant that subsequent inno-
vations were not closely connected to the knowledge and skill that led to 
the development of the original innovation. This suggests an important 
limitation on the domain of accession. The ability of accession to select fit 
owners depends on the existence of a close enough connection between the 
primary asset and the derivative asset that the owner of the primary asset 
can exercise effective control over the derivative asset.
It is also important to remember, however, that accession enhances the 
incentive to innovate, insofar as accessionary rights make original discov-
eries more valuable. Thus, if inventors know that a patentable invention 
includes not just the invention but also the rights to improvements, the 
inventor will have a greater incentive to expend effort on discovering the 
original invention. At a minimum, the incentive boost from accession for 
the original inventor has to be considered as an offset to any diminished 
incentive due to insulation from competition.
In sum, although accession appears to be generally superior to first pos-
session insofar as accession largely eliminates the four pathologies associ-
ated with first possession discussed in subpart B, it is likely that in some 
circumstances–but not all–first possession will do a better job of selecting 
initial owners who are fit. First possession is especially likely to do better on 
this score when primary rights are thin or widely disbursed and thus do not 
permit existing owners to exercise effective control over new or derivative 
rights.
d. Administrative costs
It is also important to take into account the administrative costs of award-
ing original ownership under first possession as opposed to accession. In 
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some circumstances, it is undoubtedly cheaper to establish original own-
ership by first possession–cheaper in the sense of consuming fewer legal 
resources devoted to establishing and enforcing such rights. Two variables 
of primary importance here are the costs of identifying the performative 
acts that qualify for purposes of first possession and the costs of identifying 
which resources are prominently connected to other resources for purposes 
of accession. Other things being equal, we would expect to see greater use of 
accession where the costs of identifying the performative acts that consti-
tute first possession are high relative to the costs of identifying prominent 
connections (and vice versa).
As in the case of ability to select fit owners, it is hard to draw any con-
clusions about administrative costs across the board. Certainly it is not 
possible to say that first possession is always administratively cheaper. 
In some contexts, such as reeling in fish or staking claims to spots in 
shopping center parking lots, the administrative costs of identifying the 
first possessor are low. The act that constitutes taking possession is well 
understood and easily observed by others, and disputes almost never 
result in litigation. In others contexts, like staking claims to valuable 
minerals or awarding patents to new inventions, the administrative costs 
of identification are significantly higher and disputes and litigation are 
common.
The administrative costs of awarding ownership by accession also vary 
with other contextual factors. Consider the different treatments of hard 
rock minerals and fugacious minerals under the ad coleum rule. With hard 
rock minerals, the costs of determining which minerals are prominently 
connected with which surface rights, although not trivial, are sufficiently 
low to permit allocation by accession. With fugacious minerals such as 
oil, gas, and groundwater, however, it is prohibitively expensive to deter-
mine which minerals are prominently connected with which surface rights 
(Kiew). This is because changes in pressure continually cause these miner-
als to shift around in underground cavities, where they cannot be directly 
observed. Thus, fugacious minerals are generally subject to a rule of cap-
ture or first possession.
The comparison of administrative costs is also a function of the thick-
ness of the universe of primary property rights. Suppose the contested re-
source is coconuts that fall off trees. If the trees are in a sparsely populated 
jungle with no clearly delineated land rights, then awarding the coconuts by 
first possession will undoubtedly be cheaper. But if the trees are in a highly 
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developed suburban subdivision, accession should be cheap and easy to ad-
minister. This suggests that the administrative costs of accession, and hence 
the frequency with which accession is used to award original ownership, is 
significantly influenced by the degree of articulation of primary property 
rights, which in turn will be a function of the overall level of development 
of the economy.
Accession not only requires that the system of primary property rights 
be reasonably thick and well-defined, but also that they be enforced. Where 
a system of primary property rights has broken down, or exists only on pa-
per, we are more likely to see recourse to first possession. In the California 
gold rush, for example, the federal government technically controlled near-
ly all the lands where valuable gold was discovered. But because the federal 
presence in the region was too feeble to permit enforcement of the gov-
ernment’s claims, mining rights were quickly allocated by first possession 
(Libecap 29-34; Umbeck).
Overall one would predict, following Demsetz (Demsetz; Anderson and 
Hill), that as resource values rise, as the system of primary property rights 
becomes more articulated and securely enforced, and as new technologies 
emerge that lower the costs of identifying resources as being prominently 
connected to existing rights, we will see shifts from first possession to ac-
cession in a wide variety of situations. This is because accession, as we have 
seen, is generally superior to first possession on efficiency grounds given 
the many pathologies of first possession.
• • •
To sum up, in societies where property rights are reasonably thick and se-
curely enforced, accession is generally preferred to first possession because 
accession avoids the inefficiencies associated with first possession–excessive 
racing, commons tragedies, underinvestment in common resources, and 
poor conditions for collective governance. The primary exceptions are cir-
cumstances in which we have strong reason to believe that first possession 
will do a better job of selecting fit owners (arguably the patent situation 
where rates of innovation are of special concern) or in which resources are 
fugitive or for some other reason are difficult to pin down using the concept 
of prominent connection. Overall, as property systems expand and mature, 
accession increasingly crowds out first possession as a mode of establishing 
original ownership.
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5.  Accession And internAlizAtion
We are now in a position to understand how accession is a very general 
principle, integral to the basic logic of using property as a strategy for the 
management of resources. We can also understand how accession can help 
to clarify some puzzles that economists have raised about the economic 
organization of production.
A system of property rights can be seen as a way of organizing the man-
agement of valuable resources. The property strategy appoints a singular 
gatekeeper for each resource, a mini-sovereign who determines who gets 
included and excluded, what use will be made of the resource, and when 
it will be sold (Smith, 2002). The strategy works in large part because the 
gatekeeper internalizes the benefits and costs associated with this delegat-
ed managerial function. Decisions that expand or reduce social output, as 
judged by the market, inure to the benefit and detriment of the gatekeeper-
manager (Bentham, 110).
To ensure that routine internalization of these gains and losses occurs, 
we need some principle that automatically assigns all increments in value 
that arise over time to particular assets and their associated gatekeeper-
managers. The principle of accession accomplishes this routine sweeping 
function. The principle of accession provides that all newly discovered re-
sources and increments in value are allocated to the property most “promi-
nently connected” with these new values. The principle ensures that the 
owner of the primary asset automatically internalizes every thing that af-
fects the value of the asset, net of contractual obligations.
This insight is not new. It is in accord with the Roman maxim that 
“a man should acquire the advantages of anything to the disadvantages 
of which he is subject” (Grotius, 305). It seems to have been intuited by 
Samuel Pufendorf, the seventeenth-century German natural rights theo-
rist, who wrote (Pufendorf 587): “[T]he possession of many things would 
be vain and useless, should the Fruits of them accrue to others; and the 
common Peace of Mankind would be very little promoted, if other Persons 
might challenge these improvements with the same Right and Title, as the 
Proprietor of the Substance to which they adhere.”
The critical point is that the incentive to internalize benefits and costs 
we associate with property rights is created by accession. It is precisely be-
cause the owner knows that any prominently connected gains or losses 
will be hers, no matter what, that the owner has an incentive to manage 
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the property in such a way that the gains predominate over the losses. Any 
other principle for assigning new resources and increments in value would 
dilute this incentive effect and undoubtedly divert significant resources 
into arguing over the proper assignment, rather than managing the pri-
mary resource itself.
We can also see how the principle of accession helps clarify what econo-
mists have come to call residual claimancy (Alchian and Demsetz; Jensen 
and Meckling). This refers to the economic value left over from a production 
process after specific contractual obligations have been satisfied. Although 
the term is used most often in describing relatively complex organizational 
forms such as corporations, partnerships, and trusts, it has also been used 
to analyze basic property rights (Barzel 1997, 3). Economists have offered 
a variety of explanations for why some values are reduced to fixed contrac-
tual obligations and others exist as residual claims. One explanation is that 
the party who is best able to manage risk is designated the residual claim-
ant. Another is that the party who is in the best position to affect the mean 
value of the asset is made the residual claimant. Most of these accounts have 
a strong contractarian flavor. They suggest, at least implicitly, that affected 
parties decide case-by-case how to allocate fixed and residual claims to pro-
duce optimal incentives to maximize the value of the production process.
Plausible economic arguments can explain why different patterns of re-
sidual claimancy are established in different contexts. And it is also plau-
sible that contractual provisions play a critical role in shifting the identity 
of the residual claimant from one context to the next. But is it contracts 
all the way down? The economists, who tend to view property rights in 
contractarian terms (Merrill and Smith 2001b), often seem to think so. For 
example, in one article residual claims are defined as a “contract for the 
rights to net cash flows” (Fama and Jensen 328). The problem with this 
is that we rarely, if ever, see such a contract. Contracts are used to define 
relatively specified claims, whereas the residual rights are left unspecified. 
Oliver Hart (124) has partially broken with this tradition, offering the view 
that residual claims are “closely connected” with the concept of ownership. 
But this is vague. Individuals and entities own assets, not residual claims.
Perhaps greater precision can be brought to this line of analysis by intro-
ducing the principle of accession. The principle of accession, broadly con-
ceived, means that the owner of an asset will be deemed the owner of any 
new assets or increments in value prominently connected with that asset. 
This explains the basic concept of residual claimancy in simple property 
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rights contexts. The owner of an asset will be the residual claimant of all 
derivative assets and increments in value attributable to that asset, after 
specified contractual obligations are satisfied. This understanding also sup-
plies the baseline against which modifications in the allocation of residual 
rights by contract are interpreted. In lease law, for example, the baseline 
understanding is that the tenant, as the party in possession, is the person 
entitled to capture all gains and losses associated with the asset during the 
term of the tenant’s lease (Paradine v. Jane, [1647] K.B., 82 Eng. Rep. 897). 
Modifications of this understanding, as by adopting a sharing of these gains 
and losses between landlord and tenant, require a specific lease provision 
to the contrary.
As applied to corporations, partnerships, and trusts, recognition of the 
principle of accession yields the insight that proper identification of the “re-
sidual claimant” entails a two-step analysis. First, title to the assets of the 
firm, the partnership, or the trust is held in the name of the entity itself. 
Thus, by operation of the principle of accession, any new resources or gains 
and losses in value, prominently associated with ownership of these assets, 
belong to the entity and not to anyone else. Second, the division of these 
accessionary gains and losses among the various actors who have a stake in 
the entity will be determined by entity law, including permissible contracts. 
Thus, for example, in determining how the cash flows of a corporation will 
be distributed among stockholders, bondholders, officers, directors, and the 
officers’ favorite charities, we look to business corporation law and any rel-
evant charter provisions or contractual undertakings of the firm.
This perspective can help resolve the debate over the boundaries of the 
firm. If we think of the firm as simply a nexus of contracts, the firm dis-
solves into web of contracts, with no clear line of demarcation between 
inside and outside (Eisenberg). The principle of accession suggests that the 
boundary of the firm is established by the assets to which the firm holds 
title in the name of the firm. Because of the principle of accession, the firm 
internalizes the benefits and losses from its custodial and transactional ac-
tivities regarding these assets. The firm can thus be said to be the “residual 
claimant” of the gains and losses associated with these assets.
The cash flows generated by these activities are then distributed among 
various stakeholders of the firm according to a different nexus of con-
tracts that governs relations between shareholders, directors, officers, and 
employees within the firm. The concept of residual claimancy might also 
be relevant within this internal nexus of contracts; conventionally we say 
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that the shareholders are the residual claimants within the internal nexus 
of contracts. But mixing up the two types of residual claimancy is likely to 
produce confusion. And it goes without saying that we will need boundary 
maintenance doctrines to allocate certain assets between the firm and the 
agents of the firm.
6.  implicAtions for normAtive theories
I will now switch gears and consider the principle of accession from a dif-
ferent perspective: that of normative theories of property. Although from 
an efficiency perspective the principle of accession seems largely a positive 
one, the story is rather different when we turn to normative justifications. 
Here the implications of accession seem potentially disconcerting, enough 
so that we perhaps have a clue as to why there has been so much reluctance 
to grapple with the principle of accession in American literature about 
property rights.
A. Accession and desert
Let us begin with John Locke, still today the point of departure for most 
philosophical discussions of property (e.g., Waldron, 137-252). Locke un-
abashedly grounds original ownership of property in first possession, as do 
his intellectual successors, such as Robert Nozick (at 149-82) and Richard 
Epstein (1979). Locke suggested that first possession is justified because it 
involves labor and hence desert, and/or because first possession is responsi-
ble for only a trivial portion of the contemporary value of property. Nozick 
argued that so long as acts of first possession do not leave any person worse 
off–and ordinarily he thought they do not because they involve the taking 
of things that no one previously claimed–they are unobjectionable. Epstein 
has concluded that first possession is justified because it is the method of 
original acquisition most likely to avoid “extensive and continuous state 
control” (Epstein 1979, 1239).
For Lockeans in general, the most important fact about first possession 
is that it entails a volitional act. A person must intentionally do some-
thing for which he is presumptively responsible–engage in a performative 
act–before acquiring something by first possession. I also suspect that first 
possession is attractive for Lockeans because it appears to be fair, in that it 
establishes a simple competition for resources open to all. Although luck 
as well as labor can play a role in determining who initially gets the most 
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valuable resources, all persons at least have an equal opportunity in the 
race for the prize.
The school of thought that can be called Lockean couples this emphasis 
on first possession with an associated type of argument about how we get 
from acts of original acquisition to the much wealthier and more complex 
world we live in today. This associated argument also emphasizes certain 
volitional acts that individuals take with respect to the objects over which 
ownership has been established by first possession.
Locke himself stressed the importance of human labor in transforming 
objects acquired through original possession. In an interesting exercise in 
armchair empiricism, Locke estimated that “99/100” of the value of all re-
sources in contemporary society is due to labor, as opposed to acts of original 
possession (Locke, 296). Thus, nearly all the value we attribute to property 
today is due to assiduous husbandry and cultivation; original acquisition is 
but a tiny detail. The invention of money, according to Locke, played an im-
portant role here by permitting large accumulations of wealth attributable 
to sustained labor without creating problems of spoilage or waste.
More recent accounts, including Nozick’s influential restatement of 
Locke, have emphasized the role of voluntary exchange of rights in moving 
from first possession to the complex reality of today. Nozick suggested that 
the contemporary distribution of property is just insofar as it is the prod-
uct of acts of original possession of unclaimed things followed by volun-
tary exchanges of the rights so acquired (including exchanges of labor for 
things). Thus, as long as two conditions are satisfied–justice in acquisition 
(first possession) and justice in transfer (voluntary exchange)–the current 
distribution of property is just.26 In general, the Lockean conception posits 
that a just system of property is one built up out of discrete volitional acts 
of individuals, each of which is morally justified.
The Lockean view of property has been criticized on many grounds, but 
here I am interested only in the implications of the principle of accession 
26 Nozick summarizes his position as follows (151):
If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover 
the subject of justice in holdings.
1.  A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisi-
tion is entitled to that holding.
2.  A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, 
from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3.  No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.
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for this view. The principle of accession poses a significant challenge to the 
Lockean exercise in justification. Accession sweeps into the control of own-
ers of assets all increments in value prominently connected with the asset, 
including those created by assiduous labor and smart bargaining, but also 
those that come about because of acts of God, market forces, and other 
events beyond the contemplation or control of any individual. This means 
the system of private property includes a substantial element of value that 
cannot be attributed to any volitional act on the part of the owner or her 
predecessors in title. The role of luck, which plays only a minor role un-
der first possession–mostly with regard to acts that are now only a distant 
memory–takes on a pervasive and ongoing role under accession. It is much 
more difficult to justify a system based in significant part on luck than one 
grounded solely in volitional acts like first possession, labor, and voluntary 
exchange.
To make matters worse, the principle of accession means that private 
property has built into its very operation a set of doctrines that mean the 
rich get richer. Insofar as new resources are discovered or increments in 
value become newly salient and we assign these new resources or values 
to established owners of property, then those who already have significant 
property continually get more–by operation of law. And those who have 
less property, or who have no property at all, fall further and further be-
hind. This means that private property has inherently regressive distribu-
tional tendencies. These tendencies are not merely the byproduct of some 
people working harder than others or being better negotiators than others, 
as Lockeans would like us to believe. Because of the principle of accession, 
regressive distribution is hard-wired into the very operation of a system of 
private property.
Thus, it is disappointing but not surprising that Lockeans have ignored 
the principle of accession in their various accounts of why private property 
is justified. Accession can be powerfully efficient, but it is problematic on 
the grounds of individual desert favored by Lockeans.
B. egalitarian theories
Another prominent school of normative scholarship about property is what 
I call egalitarian (e.g., Ackerman; Dworkin; Murphy and Nagel). Following 
Bentham, this view posits that property is the product of deliberate state 
action, not a sequence of individual volitional acts starting in some kind 
of state of nature. Because property is the product of collective action, the 
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touchstone for the design of any property system should be the public wel-
fare, broadly defined to include both incentives for increased output and a 
distribution of that output that ensures the widest benefit to society. The 
modern version of this perspective does not call for the abolition of private 
property, but rather for the institution of government programs that would 
ensure that everyone has enough property to lead a decent life (e.g., Acker-
man and Alstott; Gates, J.; Hockett; Sherraden). These programs would be 
funded by higher taxes on the more fortunate members of society.
The egalitarians have also overlooked the implications of accession. These 
theorists are driven primarily by a concern for distributive justice. And it is 
clear they lack enthusiasm for the institution of property. Thus, it is more 
than a little strange that they have not attacked the principle of accession as 
a factor contributing to the unequal distributive outcomes, which is what 
they find most distasteful about property. Instead these scholars tend to 
focus almost exclusively on distributional shares of wealth, conceived in 
the abstract as the power to draw on society’s resources for personal con-
sumption. Property is simply a black box whose outcomes for patterns of 
consumption they do not like. A simple explanation for this indifference to 
the accessionary feature of property might be that these scholars are just 
not very interested in how the system of property works–as opposed to its 
implications. But it is possible that there are deeper causes for the failure to 
engage with the principle of accession as well.
A possible clue to the source of this silence is provided by the comments 
of Hugo Grotius, the first of the modern expositors to reflect on the princi-
ple of accession. Grotius was generally of the view that accession is contrary 
to the “law of nature” (Grotius, 298-309). This judgment appears to have 
been driven by what he regarded as the unfairness of the winner-take-all 
feature of the Roman doctrines. For example, he wrote (id. 307):
[T]hat a thing of less value should be taken over by one of greater value…is 
naturally consistent with the facts but not with the right. He in fact who is 
the owner of one twentieth of an estate remains a part owner as well as the 
one who has the nineteenth twentieths. Therefore what the Roman law has 
decreed in some cases, or what may be decreed in others, concerning acces-
sion on account of superiority in respect to worth, is not the law of nature 
but civil law, and has in view the transacting of business more easily.
Grotius offered similar judgments about the rule of increase; the crop rules; 
and accessio, specificatio, and confusio (id. 306-08). With respect to accretion, 
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he seemed to be of the view that the public should be entitled to the new land, 
insofar as the body of water from which it was formed was subject to public 
rights (id. 300-01).
Yet Grotius drew back from making any claim that the principle of ac-
cession should be abandoned. He explained rather lamely that “the law of 
nature was not opposed” to accession because the civil law “has the right of 
conferring ownership” (id. 307). Perhaps more tellingly, his comment that 
accession makes “the transacting of business” easier suggests he might have 
perceived that accession is far more efficient than any rule of apportion-
ment or sharing of gains would be.
As we saw in Parts IV and V, the principle of accession has strong ef-
ficiency properties. It is the principal mechanism we have for ensuring the 
proper management and control of resources by internalizing to the gate-
keeper-managers of resources the costs and benefits of their decisions about 
how to deploy these resources. The principle of accession, as a mechanism 
for internalizing the costs and benefits of managerial decisions taken by the 
gatekeeper-manger, is obviously overbroad. It sweeps within its compass not 
only increments in value (or loss) due to the gatekeeper’s stewardship and 
negotiating skills, but also those due to acts of God, market forces, and pure 
dumb luck. Unfortunately, however, no mechanism has yet been devised for 
limiting the rewards and punishments of the owner of assets to those attrib-
utable to the owner’s custodial practices or acts. No perfect Georgian tax27 
has been invented that neatly subtracts windfall gains and losses, while leav-
ing in place only those changes in value attributable to individual effort and 
skill. Until a more precise filtering mechanism of gains and losses is devised, 
the property strategy must rely on the principle of accession.
The strong efficiency properties associated with accession make it difficult to 
mount a direct assault on this characteristic of property in an effort to achieve a 
more egalitarian distribution of outcomes. In particular, consider the implica-
tions of any attack on the idea that assets generally have a unique and singular 
gatekeeper-manager, inspired perhaps by a desire to promote more widespread 
sharing of the control and benefits of property. This would directly undermine 
the principle of accession, which internalizes the benefits and costs of manage-
ment decision on a singular owner to promote efficient stewardship of assets. 
27 Henry George was a nineteenth-century economist who argued that all taxes should be based 
on changes in the value of land, which he regarded as the product of forces unaffected by the 
exercise of individual choices and effort and hence as imposing no distortions in terms of 
individual incentives (George). 
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Tinkering with the core principles of property in this fashion would threaten to 
kill the capitalist goose that lays the proverbial golden egg.
Perhaps not surprising, therefore, today’s egalitarians–now that the 
Marxists have largely left the stage–confine themselves to arguing around 
the edges of property. They expose historic injustices in the acquisition of 
property. They offer proposals for guaranteed minimal entitlements. They 
applaud features of the existing system of private property that promote 
greater community controls over property, such as the regulation of spill-
overs, limits on dead hand control, public accommodations duties, anti-
discrimination laws, and expanded powers of eminent domain. But they 
offer few proposals for the modification of existing property doctrines.28 
And there are no proposals that would touch the principle of accession.
The interesting question is whether the ideals of the egalitarians can be 
realized as long as the core of private property remains intact, including the 
principle of accession. Accession makes property a powerfully efficient tool 
for managing resources, but it also creates a built-in multiplier effect that 
means owners of property continually get more property. The multiplier 
effect works most strongly with respect to the ownership of things–discrete 
assets that can be identified as being prominently connected to other dis-
crete assets and values. Insofar as programs of redistribution entail confer-
ring property on the needy in the form of money or other claims on fun-
gible wealth, it is not clear that redistribution can keep up with accession.
In theory, one could account for accession’s multiplier effect by calcu-
lating the expected differential advantage of accession-eligible assets rela-
tive to cash and increasing the amount of cash transfer payments by some 
bonus to offset this effect. In practice, the calculation would be impossible 
to develop in any principled fashion, given the incredible variety of assets 
subject to accession and the difficulty of separating out the portion of ad-
ditional wealth due to the automatic sweeping feature of accession from 
the portion due to good management practices (stimulated in part by the 
incentive effects of accession). And it would be difficult to explain the need 
for bonus payments to the public.
One lesson for egalitarians therefore might be that programs that put 
cash in the hands of the poor, such as the Earned Income Credit program 
of the income tax, have certain disadvantages relative to programs designed 
to put real assets in the hands of the less fortunate, especially productive 
28 For a rare exception, see Dagan and Heller, suggesting that the automatic right of partition 
should be qualified to promote greater efforts in collaborative ownership of property.
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assets–including enhanced human capital–(De Soto). Forty acres and a 
mule might have been a superior idea for a redistributive program, relative 
to cash bounties or adjusting rates of taxation.
c. preserving the public domain
A third normative theme invokes the idea of preserving public rights, and 
in particular the notion that a significant share of resources should remain 
in an open access state or the public domain. The idea of the public do-
main has powerful resonance in American culture. Throughout the nine-
teenth century and into the early decades of the twentieth, a huge land mass 
known as the public domain–essentially most of the American West–was 
open to claiming under various first possession-like doctrines, including 
preemption, homesteading, the Mining Act, appropriative water rights, and 
even a general privilege to construct roads on public lands (Gates, P.). This 
public domain was closed, for practical purposes, in 1934 and officially in 
1976. But traces of the idea live on. There is still a general presumption of 
open public access to federal landholdings, even if one cannot claim any-
thing after one gets there. The Wilderness Act, the National Parks Act, and 
the evolving management conventions associated with the national forests, 
all suggest strong political support for the idea that big chunks of the public 
domain should remain free of development, precisely so that this open ac-
cess state can be preserved–if only for its symbolic value.
Today, the battle cry to save the public domain is more often encoun-
tered with respect to intellectual goods, and in particular digital communi-
cations, rather than more traditional tangible resources such as forests and 
tundra (e.g., Benkler; Boyle; Lessig). The basic concern, as Carol Rose has 
put it, is that we can have “too much property” where intellectual goods are 
concerned. Because intellectual goods are nonrivalrous, the correct price 
for such goods, from an allocational perspective, is zero. Any attempt to 
enforce exclusion rights in such goods, and hence to charge some posi-
tive price for access, will cut off access at a suboptimal level. The claim is 
also made that intellectual creation is a collective enterprise and that “total 
creativity is enhanced by open access and interaction among all entrants’ 
ideas” (Rose 1998, 153).
I am not interested here with whether or to what extent claims of Larry 
Lessig and others that we are experiencing a rapid “enclosure” of the pub-
lic domain are true. The only point I wish to make is that the principle of 
accession, insofar as it applies to intellectual goods, inevitably contributes 
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to a shrinking of the public domain. The scope of copyright is magnified 
by derivative rights, which necessarily reduce the remaining sphere of the 
public domain. Indeed, Lessig has specifically attacked the doctrine of de-
rivative rights in copyright as one of the factors threatening “enclosure” 
of the public domain (Lessig, 294-95). The same point applies to patent 
improvements, trademarks protected by anti-dilution provisions, and pub-
licity rights. Thus, we have another reason to worry about the normative 
implications of the principle of accession.
• • •
In short, the principle of accession is a problematic feature of property 
from a normative perspective. It is centrally responsible for the efficiency 
of property, but makes it more difficult to justify property using commonly 
shared moral perspectives. Because it appears we cannot live without the 
principle of accession, the attempts to justify the existing system of private 
property, or to describe an alternative vision of an ideal system of property, 
will remain stunted and incomplete as long as this principle is ignored.
7.  conclusion
I have covered a lot of ground, the justification being that the principle of 
accession is largely terra incognita insofar as American property scholars are 
concerned. The central propositions I have sought to advance are that the 
principle of accession is a distinctive means of acquiring original ownership 
of property; that accession is widespread and in fact ubiquitous; that acces-
sion is almost certainly more efficient than first possession in circumstances 
where property rights are reasonably thick; that accession awards new re-
sources to prominently connected owners because this saves on information 
costs and selects as owners persons who are generally fit; and that accession 
plays a critical role in establishing the internalization function that makes 
property such a valuable tool for resource management. I have also suggest-
ed that the principle of accession highlights a deep tension in the structure 
of property rights between the efficiency-promoting aspects of property and 
the normative implications of property. I have made no effort to resolve 
that tension or to indicate what qualifications, if any, should be made to the 
principle of accession to trade off some efficiency for greater equity. I am 
skeptical that any such modifications would be desirable. But the case in 
support of that judgment must wait another day.
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